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ABSTRACT
In this article, we compared and tried to explain deputies’ and voters’ perceptions 
about various dimensions of European integration. The general assertion that the 
political elite’s perceptions tend to be more pro-integration finds some support in our 
analysis, but the results indicate this difference − in the Portuguese case − is smaller 
than has been suggested in the mainstream literature. The data also showed citizens 
are more in favour of enlargement than their representatives are. We also observe 
these assertions hold true only for the deputies of the three parties with experience of 
government. Finally, we try to explain the divide between a voter and their deputy’s 
position on European integration, and we observed that the main explanatory vari-
able for a narrow divide is political interest and information (which also explains 
the voters’ probability of having an opinion). 
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 1. A referendum was also 
held in Ireland, where 
70 per cent of the vote 
was in favour.
 2. As Eurobarometer 
polls show, public 
support for European 
integration flagged 
during the 1990s and 
has remained at a 
much lower level to 
this day.
 3. In the Eurobarometer 
survey of December 
2009, 52 per cent of 
Portuguese, 57 per cent 
of the EU-15 and 
53 per cent of the EU-27 
thought their country’s 
membership of the EU 
was a good thing.
INTRODUCTION
During the first 40 years of the European Communities, European leaders 
tended to ignore the role of public opinion in shaping support for the process 
of European unification. Initially, the European Union (EU) was not conceived 
as an inclusive political project, but mainly as an elitist and functional solu-
tion to structural and macro-economic problems. Few people were suggesting 
placing coal and steel under a supranational authority would initiate a proc-
ess that would change the traditional way people thought about government, 
democracy and citizenship. For this reason, researchers and decision-makers 
alike suggested at this time that intergovernmental bargaining, elite prefer-
ences and the actions of organised interests at the base of European integra-
tion was taking place under an aura of ‘permissive consensus’ − that is, a 
combination of loyalty, blind faith and apathy on the part of the voters. 
Things have changed since then, and this so-called ‘permissive 
consensus’ started to unravel at the beginning of the 1990s, during a period 
in which Europe was moving towards its full political development. In 
particular, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht treaty, France’s narrow 
approval, and the rejection by the Conservative rebels were the first serious 
challenges to Europe as a political project.1 Although the Danish no vote 
would eventually be solved by conventional intergovernmental negotiations 
(setting an opt-out for Denmark), the damage was done: there was no 
turning back for the democratic reformist mood of the 1990s. The public 
opposition continued in the form of votes for anti-European parties, in the 
opinion polls and in the referendums subsequently held (above all in the 
rejection in France and the Netherlands of the draft constitutional treaty and 
in Ireland of the Lisbon Treaty).2
In the midst of this growing Euro-scepticism, citizens have come to 
question, protest and mobilise against Europe. In other words, European 
public opinion has become ‘politicised’. Not surprisingly, political actors are 
responding to this development. On the one hand, new Euro-sceptic groups 
have recently been formed at the national and European levels. On the other 
hand, traditional political forces have also included European issues in their 
strategies, public discourse, and manifestoes for national elections (Imig and 
Tarrow 2001; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; Koopmans 2007). 
This increased ‘politicisation’ over European issues by national political 
parties and voters at large has important consequences for political represen-
tation. In theory, political parties try to capture voters’ concerns about Europe 
and, once in power, should respond to them. Again, in theory, this process 
will result in − or at least it will be facilitated by − a fair degree of congru-
ence between deputies and their representatives in their views of Europe. In 
practice, however, it has been said the mass public is much less enthusiastic 
towards the European Union than their deputies. Political elites, it is claimed, 
have pushed European integration beyond the will of the people. Is this true? 
How real is the divide between political elites and public opinion, and what 
can explain it? 
In this article, these are the questions we hope to answer, specifically for 
the Portuguese case. We use Portugal as an extreme case, as it is a country 
in which present public support for European integration is lower than the 
European average,3 and where the population is relatively poorly educated, 
exposed to media and interested in politics (at least compared with the 
15 ‘old’ member states). Thus, Portugal is a case in which one would expect 
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 4. Even if national 
parliaments still 
play a marginal role 
in the EU decision-
making process and 
deputies do not all 
have the same degree 
of involvement in 
European affairs, we 
cannot ignore the 
unprecedented level 
of Europeanisation 
that has taken place in 
recent years. Not only 
have we witnessed 
the creation of special 
European affairs 





of and involvement 
in EU matters 
and monitoring 
government 
representatives in the 
council and European 
Council, but we have 
also seen changes 
in the behavioural 
patterns of national 
deputies (Auel and Benz 
2006).
to find an important difference between the population and their deputies in 
respect of their opinion towards European integration. In doing so, we shall 
move beyond the existing literature by using data drawn from face-to-face 
interviews with deputies about their perceptions of Europe. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
This article is structured around three main objectives. Our first goal is to 
assess the degree of congruence between deputies and citizens in relation to 
six dimensions of European integration. Such an exercise does not go without 
a certain ambiguity, given the fact that the cognitive levels of voters and depu-
ties on the subject of the structure and processes of the EU remain substan-
tially different. Citizens organise their knowledge about Europe on a basis of 
abstract mental frames, fed by a variety of sources (principally the media, but 
also all kinds of social groups, the Internet, books, etc.), with different degrees 
of sophistication and consistency (Kufer 2009: 36–7). In contrast, deputies’ 
perceptions (institutional representations) are endogenous to the EU politi-
cal system, and for that reason they tend to express a more elaborate and 
informed vision of its modus operandi.4 Still, a fair degree of congruence 
between deputies and those they represent in their views of Europe would 
increase the probability voters are well reflected and thus the representative 
process functions adequately.
The conventional wisdom is that elites are more in favour of European 
integration than the public, but, as has been claimed before, this argument 
rests on a weak empirical foundation (Hooghe 2003). Extensive research 
has been carried out on the nature of support for European integration, 
but there are few comparisons between the views of national deputies and 
their voters. The few existing studies rely on proxies for assessing deputies’ 
views: for example, party manifestoes or expert judgements (Van der Eijk and 
Franklin 1991; Gabel 1998; Ray 2003), while the few studies directly consid-
ering elite perceptions of Europe focus on European rather than on national 
political elites: on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (Schmitt and 
Thomassen 2000);  on permanent representatives (Beyers and Dierickx 1997); 
and on senior European Commission (EC) officials (Hooghe 2001). 
To our knowledge, the only comparative assessment between national 
political elites and citizens’ opinions about Europe was carried out by Hooghe 
(2003). Her study demonstrates two dynamics: (1) there is little difference 
between national political elites and citizens regarding their level of support 
for the further pooling of authority in the EU in important policy fields; and 
(2) to a larger degree than the citizens, political elites conceive of European 
integration as an optimal solution for those policy fields in which externalities 
go beyond the jurisdiction of the state (e.g. the environment). 
In this article, we aim to test to what extent conventional wisdom − 
according to which deputies are more pro-integrationist than those who vote 
for them − holds true for the Portuguese case. Hence, we posit:
H1: Deputies are more in favour of European integration than the electorate.
Research also reveals deputies tend to adopt more extreme policy positions 
on both the left and the right of the ideological line (see, for example, 
Converse 1964; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Miller et al. 1999). Portugal is 
no different in this regard (Belchior 2008). In line with this theory, it makes 
sense to argue the political elite will also hold more extreme attitudes about 
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 5. The utilitarian 
perspective states 
citizens’ support 
for integration is 
positively related to 
their welfare gains 
from EU integration 
(Anderson and 
Reichert 1996; Gabel 





immigration are more 
likely to evaluate other 
European nations 
unfavourably and are 
therefore less likely 
to support European 
integration (De Vreese 
and Boomgaarden 
2005; McLaren 2001, 
2002). Unfortunately, 
our data does not 
allow us to test 
another important 
explanatory variable − 
the materialist/post-
materialist values 
of the individual. 
According to 
Inglehart’s theory of 
value change, post-
materialist voters are 
more likely to favour 
European integration 
(Inglehart 1977). 
Europe than the electorate. In other words, we expect the proportion of 
strongly pro- or anti-European deputies to be greater than the corresponding 
proportion of citizens.
H2: Political elites hold more extreme views about Europe than citizens do.
The second objective of this article is concerned with assessing the degree of 
congruence between the European attitudes of deputies and those of their 
partisans. For this purpose, deputies and the electorate were divided accord-
ing to the party to which they support. This exercise aims to fuel the debate on 
the divergence or convergence between voters and their representatives with 
respect to policy positions, an issue that − so far − has not been sufficiently 
tested and explained. Representation studies demonstrate there is a reasonable 
level of congruence between political leaders and their voters (e.g. Converse 
and Pierce 1986; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996) and that generally speaking 
the record of left-wing parties tends to correspond better to their electorate’s 
policy positioning (Inglehart 1970; Gibson and Harmel 1998: 225–6; Pierce 
1999: 27). While this finding is not confirmed for Portugal (Freire and Belchior 
2009), we posit: 
H3: Left-wing party camps display a more congruent position on Europe than 
their right-wing counterparts.
The third and final objective of this paper is concerned with explaining the 
divergent views of the elite and the mass public on European integration. 
The literature on representation theory shows there is a higher level of repre-
sentativeness when individuals are strong supporters of a given party and are 
involved in politics (Barnes 1977; Hill and Anderson 1995; Converse 1964; 
Zaller 1992). There is no a priori reason not to believe these representation 
factors hold true for voter and deputy positioning on European integration. 
Hence, we posit: 
H4: The distance between voters’ and their deputies’ views on the European • 
Union is directly proportionate to the voters’ party attachment.
H5: The distance between voters’ and their deputies’ views on the European • 
Union is directly proportionate to the voters’ political interest.
Finally, it has been argued that, among other factors, the party/voter link on the 
issue of European integration also depends on internal party unity, as the pres-
entation of contradictory messages by various party leaders muddles the cues 
sent by the party to its supporters (Ray 2003). Hence, our final hypothesis:
H6: For any particular party, the distance between voters’ and their deputies’ • 
views on the European Union is directly proportionate to the degree of unity 
in the political positioning among the deputies.
When testing these hypotheses, we need to control for important alterna-
tive explanatory factors. Indeed, it may be the case that deputies and those 
who voted for them hold similar views ‘by chance’ − that is, they may share 
characteristics that are likely to make them more Euro-pessimistic or Euro-
optimistic independently of the variables described above. Hence, all variables 
that may explain voter support for European integration should be controlled 
for, including the voter’s educational background, their perceptions about the 
economic situation and their perceptions about immigration.5 
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 6. From a formal point of 
view, the Socialist Party 
(PS − Partido Socialista) 
had been created in 
exile one year before 
the revolution. In 
reality, however, the 
party owes much of its 
existence to the post-
1974 democratisation 
context.
 7. Unlike in many other 
systems, in which 
parties are voluntary 
and unregulated civil 
society associations, 
political parties 
in Portugal are 
strictly regulated 
constitutional bodies.
SETTING THE SCENE: THE PORTUGUESE PARTY SYSTEM
Before comparing the positions of voters and their parties in relation to 
European matters, it is useful to give a quick overview of the Portuguese party 
system for those readers unfamiliar with it. 
With the exception of the Communist Party (PCP − Partido Comunista 
Português), all Portuguese parties are post-1974 creations.6 Their consti-
tutional and democratisation context, and in particular their revolutionary 
dimension, help explain the weak social foundations of Portuguese politi-
cal parties (Jalali 2007: 62–8). They have not evolved from pre-existing social 
cleavages, but from a democratic transition process that placed parties at the 
centre of the new regime (Bruneau 1997; De Sousa 2001; Jalali 2007).7
The distance between parties and those they represent was partially 
compensated by their proximity to the state and access to public resources, 
as the capacity to redistribute those resources in a selective manner helped 
parties to institutionalise and consolidate electoral clienteles (De Sousa 2001: 
159–60). With the exception of the PCP, which has traditionally recruited its 
cadres from dedicated activists, the leadership of a party does not spring from 
among the party activists. Parties remain ‘different arrangements of person-
alities’ (Lopes 1997: 30), attracting a multitude of interests and clienteles 
important to electoral success. This strategic rather than programme-based 
mobilisation of voters has consequences in terms of the nature of representa-
tion and the divide between voters and their representatives.
The PCP was created in 1921 and forced underground five years later: 
it remained clandestine for 48 years − as long as authoritarian government 
lasted in Portugal. The PCP played a key role in the revolution of 1974, which 
helped the party become and remain a major player in the present-day party 
system, despite the collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe. In 
the aftermath of the revolution, the PCP was able to build a solid and exten-
sive organisation, superior to that of its adversaries in terms of both material 
and human resources.
The PCP boasted the largest and territorially most developed party 
machine, which helped it survive the shock of the end of the Cold War. While 
remaining one of the most orthodox communist parties in Western Europe, 
the PCP has been able to adapt to emerging realities. It exerts a very tight 
control over the leadership of one of the major trade unions (CGTP-IN − 
Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-Intersindical Nacional) 
and sponsored the creation of an ecological movement in 1982, which later 
became a party (PEV − Partido Ecologista ‘Os Verdes’). Since 1987, the PCP 
has run for elections in coalition with the Greens and Democratic Intervention 
(ID − Intervenção Democrática) as the Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU − 
Coligação Democrática Unitária).
The PCP was a member of the Comintern until the collapse of this organi-
sation, which is perhaps the reason why European integration was not a major 
policy priority for its leaders. Rather, they have traditionally resisted any pool-
ing of sovereignty within a supranational body. Their Euro-pessimism only 
slowly softened in favour of a more sceptical stand due to the party’s inevita-
ble engagement in the first round of European elections in Portugal in 1988. 
Currently, the PCP is a member of the United European Left/Nordic Green 
Left (UEL/NGL) parliamentary group in the European Parliament.
By contrast, the Socialist Party (PS − Partido Socialista) has never been 
able to develop a mass organisational structure or levels of affiliation similar 
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 8. The successful entry of 
the BE to Portuguese 
party politics contrasts 
largely with the 
unsuccessful and 
brief existence of 
the Democratic 
Renewal Party (PRD − 
Partido Renovador 
Democrático), a small 
party created in 1985 
with the support of the 
last military president, 
General Ramalho 
Eanes. Despite the 
fact both the BE 
and PRD have made 
the moralisation of 
political (and economic) 
life their major political 
quest, the former has 
been able to mobilise a 
series of other divisive 
issues in Portuguese 
party politics and 
consolidate its 
electorate, while the 
later was successful 
in helping the 
minority PSD (Partido 
Social Democrata) 
government to collapse 
in 1987, at the cost 
of losing its electoral 
support and seeing the 
PSD re-elected with the 
first absolute majority 
for a single party.
to other European social democratic parties. At its core it is dominated by 
liberal-left, well-educated, bourgeois dignitaries, and its decentralised organi-
sational structure shows little coordination between the national headquarters 
and local branches. The Socialists have also undergone a process of renewal 
in recent years following their first experience in office as a minority govern-
ment. Under the leadership of both Guterres and (currently) Socrates, the 
party’s policy stand has moved towards the centre, with a catch-all appeal 
that attempts to reconcile the practices of market liberalism with democratic 
socialist principles − in line with former British prime minister Tony Blair’s 
‘Third Way’. This partly explains the party’s electoral success, at the cost of 
leaving the factions further to the left unsatisfied with its economic policy 
preferences while in office. The Socialist leadership and electorate have always 
been supportive of European integration. The party is a member of the Party 
of European Socialists.
This renovation of the left was not enough to address emerging social 
tensions and left space for a new force to appear, one that embraced the 
post-materialist discourse that had been ignored by both the communist and 
socialist formations. The new radical left-wing party, the Left Bloc (BE − Bloco 
de Esquerda), emerged from the convergence of two old extreme left-wing 
parties and a political movement and formed a party to compete in the 1999 
general election. 
This left-wing formation was able to attract an urban, well-educated, 
libertarian electorate that felt increasingly unrepresented by the two domi-
nant left-wing formations (the PS and PCP). The entry of this new party has 
had an important impact on the party system. The Portuguese party system 
has evolved from a four to a five-party structure, and this has had important 
implications in terms of political representation and electoral competition.8 As 
Freire put it, 
For the period 1975–96, the post-materialist issue dimension was irrel-
evant both as a domain of competition and of identification. … With 
the emergence of the BE as a parliamentary force, however, new politi-
cal issues have become a domain of competition between the left 
 (particularly the BE, but also the PCP and PS) and the right (PSD and 
particularly the CDS-PP). From 1996 until at least 2005, post-materi-
alism has been a pertinent dimension of policy competition, although 
only with medium-level significance. 
(Freire 2005: 29–30) 
The BE has become a permanent feature in national party politics and is grad-
ually making its way both at the local and European level. The BE elected its 
first MEP in the 2004 European elections. In the European Parliament, the BE 
(like the PCP) is an associate member of the UEL/NGL parliamentary group.
The PSD is often labelled ‘the most Portuguese of all parties’. The desig-
nation is not so inaccurate in the sense that it is a catch-all party, embrac-
ing representatives whose policy positions range from the moderate left 
to the liberal and conservative right, and it is a party with a broad territo-
rial presence. The two major identifying elements cutting across the socially 
diverse elements of its electorate are a common hostility towards the state 
and its administration and a general sympathy for market rules and private 
property. Like the Socialists, the PSD has a weak and flexible organisational 
structure, allowing local branches great independence. Until the 1990s, the 
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PSD was associated with the European Liberal Democratic and Reformist 
Group (ELDR) in the European Parliament. Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
however, it has aligned itself with the conservative European People’s Party 
(EPP) (Frain 1997).
Finally, the Popular Party (CDS-PP − Centro Democrático e Social-Partido 
Popular) is essentially a party of notables that has never been able to transform 
itself into a catch-all party of the right, as it set out to do in its first years 
of existence. It has fewer resources than its adversaries and is continuously 
embroiled in leadership quarrels, which is reflected in its ever-changing 
electoral positioning. The party has swung from Christian democracy to a 
liberal-conservative, and sometimes to populism, depending on its changing 
leadership. On various occasions, this has led the CDS-PP to join short-lived 
tactical coalitions with the two major parties − the PS and the PSD − but the 
party’s small base among the electorate has not allowed it to gain a pivotal 
position in the formation of a government (Robinson 1996: 961–4). Presently, 
the party represents the more Christian democratic/conservative segment of 
the population. Due to its strong Christian democratic background, the party 
joined the EPP following Portugal’s accession to the (then) EEC. 
The Euro-sceptic stance of the early 1990s, under the leadership of Manuel 
Monteiro, not only cost the party the loss of several senior political figures but 
also led to its expulsion from the EPP in 1992. Following this, the CDS-PP 
joined the Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN). After its massive 
defeat in the 1997 local elections, Manuel Monteiro resigned and Paulo Portas 
saw a window of opportunity to consolidate his leadership by returning to the 
party’s Christian democratic roots and setting himself the challenge of keep-
ing all the party’s 15 seats in parliament in the general election of 1999, which 
he eventually did. Since then, the CDS-PP has adopted a Euro-pragmatic 
stance, which, in turn, led to its return to the EPP in July 2004.
HOW GREAT IS THE DISCREZPANCY BETWEEN VOTERS’ AND 
DEPUTIES’ OPINIONS ABOUT EUROPE?
It is time for us to proceed to our first objective and attempt to discover to 
what extent deputies’ and voters’ political evaluations of Europe match each 
other. In other words, to what extent is the position of deputies on Europe 
representative of citizens’ expectations?
Data
For this empirical test, we used two surveys conducted in Portugal between 
the beginning of spring and the end of summer 2008. The mass survey relied 
on a multi-stage probabilistic sample of Portuguese citizens aged 18 and above 
who were resident on the mainland (N=1350). Some weighting in terms of 
age, gender and education was carried out to make the sample more repre-
sentative of the population profile. A similar questionnaire was used to survey 
Portuguese deputies on the same topics, with a 60 per cent rate of response. 
Again, some weighting in terms of party affiliation and gender was carried out 
to correct any deviation resulting from the composition of parliament in 2008.
Comparing the elite and the citizens
In order to test Hypothesis H1, according to which deputies are more in favour 
of European integration than citizens are, we first built an index to measure 
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 9. The five questions 
are: Do you think that 
a political Europe is 
necessary? Do you 
think that Portuguese 
membership is a 
good thing? Do you 
think that unification 
of the EU should be 
pushed further? Are 
you satisfied with EU 
democracy? Do you 
think that the reform 
treaty is a good text? support for Europe, using five dimensions. The index is calculated by meas-
uring the mean of the answers to five questions on European integration. It 
is a variable with ten values ranging from 0−1, with a score of 0 when the 
respondent does not agree at all with any of the pro-European statements and 
1 when they agree strongly with them all.9 In Table 1 we present the mean, 
median and standard deviation of this index for both citizens and deputies, 
excluding for now those voters who are indifferent or ‘don’t know’. 
The data shows Hypothesis H1 lacks clear confirmation. While it is true 
deputies are slightly more pro-European than voters, the distance between 
the averages of the two indices is not very important (a 0.13 difference), while 
the median is identical. We also observe that the standard deviation is slightly 
more important for voters. 
In Figure 1, we compare the distribution of the index ‘support for Europe’, 
again excluding for now those voters who are indifferent or who ‘don’t 
know’. There is a relatively high degree of congruence between the voters 
and deputies taking anti-European on European integration, but the data 
also shows that more voters than deputies take an intermediate stand, and 
that the relationship is reversed for those who are very fervent supporters 
of European integration. Hence, Hypothesis H2, according to which political 
elites hold more extreme views about Europe than the voters, is only partially 
confirmed: deputies are more strongly pro-European than voters, but we do 




Std. Deviation 0.28 0.33
Figure 1: Index of deputy and voter support for Europe.
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find a slightly larger proportion of strongly anti-Europeans among the popu-
lation than among the elite. 
Table 1 looks into the specific questions rather than the index and also 
includes an additional question on enlargement. It shows the average differ-
ence between deputies’ and voters’ opinions in general without taking into 
consideration party positioning. Overall, as observed above, the opinions of 
deputies and voters tend to converge both in what they consider to be positive 
and negative about European integration. The degree of discrepancy is lower 
than 13 per cent for most dimensions except that relating to greater unifica-
tion of the EU. 
For the most part, mass public opinion is sceptical about deepening the EU 
(only 41.7 per cent is in favour), contrasting greatly with the political class’s 
efforts to push integration further (73.2 per cent). This lack of citizen support 
for deepening the EU may illustrate citizens no longer believe the additional 
pooling of sovereignty means additional gains for them, as if a law of dimin-
ishing marginal returns applies to the usefulness of the EU. However, this 
difference may to some extent be artificial, as the percentages represent an a 
posteriori two-way division of the answers on a 0−10 scale. 
This table also shows that political elites tend to be only slightly more 
supportive of European integration than the public, except on one dimension 
of integration − enlargement. Surprisingly, public opinion is slightly more in 
favour of enlargement than the elites are. However, we should note this is still 
considered a negative dimension of integration among both the political elites 
and the public at large. The percentage of those who support enlargement is 
very low in both cases: less than a third of deputies and voters support further 
enlargement. There is very possibly a good reason for this: the eastern European 
enlargement had a short-term negative impact upon the traditional and labour-
intensive sectors of the Portuguese economy, such as shoemaking and textiles. 
In this survey, we also asked deputies which countries they would accept 
as EU members and which they would leave outside the European project. 
The Portuguese political elites ranked Turkey and the Balkans as the first 
members of the ‘club’ that should be included, while the few citizens who 
answered that question favoured Switzerland’s entry to the EU. 
As noted elsewhere, the main pitfall of survey questions is the rela-
tively high proportion of citizens who do not know or who refuse to answer 
Table 2: Attitude towards the EU: Voters and deputies (all).
Attitude towards the EU All





Thinks that a political Europe is necessary.  86.6 91.5 – 4.9
Thinks that Portuguese membership is a good thing. 83.5 96.3 –12.8
Thinks that unification of the EU should be pushed further. 41.7 73.2 –31.5
Is satisfied with EU democracy. 56.8 63.2 – 6.4
Supports enlargement. 30.2 25.6 4.6
Thinks that the Reform Treaty is a good text. 72.8 76 – 3.2
Average 61.9 71 – 9
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(Bacalhau 1994; Lobo 2003). This absence of an opinion could be derived 
from positive or negative factors, i.e. from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘political 
apathy’ explanations (Lobo 2003:100), or simply from candid ignorance about 
more elaborate aspects of European integration. In our sample, the proportion 
of respondents who ‘don’t know/don’t answer’ varies according to the ques-
tion asked: from 10 per cent for the question about Portugal’s membership of 
the EU to 45 per cent for the question on enlargement and 61 per cent for the 
question on the Reform Treaty. 
We observe two different patterns, reflecting whether the question focuses 
on the relationship between Portugal and the EU or addresses the EU as a 
political institution (Lobo 2003). Firstly, when a question is ‘intuitive’ − that 
is, when it asks for a vague opinion about the EU, such as ‘Do you think that 
Portuguese membership of the EU is a good thing?’ − the proportion of those 
who do not know is very low (10 per cent). These questions measure some-
thing akin to Easton’s (1965) notion of affective support. On the other hand, 
when the question is less general and more ‘technical’, the non-response rate 
increases − 27 per cent do not know if a political Europe is necessary, while 
45 per cent do not know if the Lisbon Treaty is a good text. 
Comparing deputies and their voters by party 
In Table 3, we show the percentage of deputies and their supporters that 
agree with a series of European integration proposals that affect EU legiti-
macy. In order to compare the degree of consensus or discrepancy between 
deputies’ and voters’ opinions about Europe for a given party, we have used − 
at the deputy level − the party list within which the deputy was elected as a 
means of grouping the parliamentarians by party and, at the electorate level, 
the voters’ party identification, to segment the population by parties. 
Despite the degree of convergence between deputies’ and voters’ percep-
tions of Europe, once we take party positions into consideration we also 
observe important variations between and within parties for each of the differ-
ent dimensions of integration.
When accessing the overall support for Europe, we need to distinguish 
between parties with and parties without experience of government − in other 
words, parties that have governed alone or in coalition (PS, PSD, PDS-PP) 
and parties that have not (BE, CDU-PCP). While it has been said political 
elites are generally more in favour of European integration than citizens at 
large, this seems to be true − in the case of Portugal − only for government-
experienced parties. 
Political elites from parties with experience of government are also more 
pro-European than their supporters, as well as being more pro-European in 
general. Deputies from both the BE and CDU-PCP are, however, less support-
ive of European integration and are also less supportive than their traditional 
party sympathisers. This tendency has already been observed by Marina Costa 
Lobo, using another data set, in which she showed that ‘minor parties, which 
have been systematically excluded from government since 1982, have adopted 
an anti-integration stance’ (Lobo 2003: 115). Since government-experienced 
parties represent the larger slice of the electorate, the data reconfirms the 
traditional view that political elites are more supportive of European integra-
tion than their party supporters.
There is a greater discrepancy between deputies’ and voters’ perceptions of 
Europe among parties without experience of government (BE and CDU-PCP). 
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We also observe that the most congruent party is the PSD. This clearly fails to 
confirm Hypothesis H3, according to which left-wing party camps display a 
more congruent position on Europe than their right-wing counterparts.
While deputies from both left-wing parties without experience of govern-
ment are not satisfied with European democracy or the prospects of insti-
tutional reform (the Reform Treaty), BE deputies display a more positive 
vision of Europe than CDU-PCP deputies (an average of 33.3 per cent against 
16.7 per cent).
CDS-PP supporters are the most sceptical of all voters. They believe 
Portuguese membership of the EU is a good thing in principle (83.3 per cent), 
but in practice the country has gained too little from it; hence their discontent 
with the functioning of the EU and the prospects of reform (only 31.6 per cent 
are satisfied with EU democracy and 30.8 per cent believe the Reform Treaty 
is a good text). 
This disenchantment may be understood through the lens of a cost-benefit 
vision of European integration. The traditional basis of CDS-PP support comes 
from economic sectors that were negatively affected by the implementation 
of the Common Market and the expansion of Europe eastwards: small 
farmers, fishermen, shopkeepers and small and medium-size businesses. 
The Europeanism of the CDS-PP political elites contrasts with the Euro-
scepticism of its traditional electorate; however, since the CDS-PP has been 
Table 3: Deputies’ and voters’ attitudes towards European integration (%).




































































95.2 66.7 28.5 66 20 46 87.4 100 –12.6 82.1 100 –17.9 83.3 100 –16.7
EU  unification 
should be 
pushed further. 
36.7 66.7 –30 30.8 0 30.8 45.4 85.3 –39.9 43.8 64.4 –20.6 10 75 –65
EU  democracy 
is  satisfactory.
48.5 0 48.5 40.8 0 40.8 68.1 64 4.1 51.1 82.2 –31.1 31.6 50 –18.4
Enlargement is 
a good thing.
42.9 0 42.9 25 80 –55 33.7 23.3 10.4 27 25.6 1.4 17.6 28.6 –11
Reform Treaty 
is a good text.
60.9 0 60.9 46.7 0 46.7 82.7 93.9 –11.2 80 67.4 12.6 30.8 87.5 34
Average 47.3 33.3 23.1 47.6 16.7 30.9 66.6 77.5 –11 62.4 72.5 –10.1 38.1 71.4 –18.3
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 10. The tests were run 
using current voting 
intentions or voting 
practice in the 
preceding election. 
We did not observe a 
significant change in 
the correlations above.
in government (and its electorate may believe the party can have a greater 
say in European affairs in the future), the average discrepancy between 
perceptions at the top and bottom of the party is less significant than one may 
be led to believe.
Almost all deputies are against widening the EU. Those from the CDU-PCP 
are largely (80 per cent) in favour − a result (which is inconsistent with the 
opinions held by other deputies and the majority of citizens) that comes as 
a surprise, since to a large extent the party’s constituency includes unskilled 
workers whose lives have been negatively affected by the entry of the 12 new 
central and eastern European members. 
Almost all deputies are in favour of deepening the EU. The exception again 
is those representing the CDU-PCP who are completely against it. PS depu-
ties are the most in favour of pushing further EU unification (85.3 per cent). 
This comes as no surprise given the party is currently in power. Instead, what 
comes as a surprise is the fact that CDU-PP deputies are also largely in favour 
of deepening the Union when their party supporters are by far the most scep-
tical about it. 
While on enlargement there is a consensual negative perception of its 
effects, on the deepening issue the political elites are more proactive than 
the electorate. In a way, this confirms the traditional view that the engine of 
European integration is the consensus among the political elite, but it also 
denotes the growing scepticism of citizens in relation to the pooling of politi-
cal powers in Europe.
EXPLAINING THE DIVIDE
The comparison between deputies’ perceptions and those of their party 
supporters shows that, with some exceptions, the degree of support for the 
European Union is relatively similar for both groups of interviewees. 
The third objective of our research is to explain the divide between voters 
and their deputies. The operationalisation of each variable is described briefly 
below, while more detailed information is presented in the appendix. 
The dependent variable, the divide between a voter and their deputy’s 
perceptions about the EU, was obtained by calculating the mean index of 
support for European integration on the part of the party with which the 
respondent identifies and subtracting it from the voters’ index of support for 
European integration.10 To test hypothesis H4 (The distance between voters’ 
and their deputies’ views on the European Union is directly proportionate 
to the voters’ party attachment), a variable measuring party attachment 
was introduced. To test hypothesis H5 (The distance between voters’ and 
their deputies’ views on the European Union is directly proportionate to the 
voters’ political interest), an index was built incorporating ‘the frequency of 
political discussion’ and ‘political interest’ variables. Finally, in order to test 
hypothesis H6 (For any particular party, the distance between voters’ and 
their deputies’ views on the European Union is directly proportionate to the 
degree of unity in the political positioning among the deputies), we inserted 
a variable ‘party unity’. This variable is equal to one minus the standard 
deviation of the index of support for Europe on the part of the party with 
which the respondent identifies. 
To control for other explanatory variables, we included a variable measur-
ing education, an economic evaluation index (at the national and personal 
level) and an index measuring positive sentiments towards immigrants. 
PJSS_10.1_Moury_23-41.indd   34 4/18/11   10:34:25 AM
Comparing deputies’ and voters’ support for Europe
35
Table 4 shows the results of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
explaining the divide between deputies and those who voted for them. 
In Model 1, we test all variables identified in the literature and in our 
hypotheses: the voters’ political information and interest, the strength of 
their party attachment, the unity of the party supported and their educational 
Table 4: Ordinary least squares estimates of the determinants of the difference between the voter’s position and 
their deputy’s mean position.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
**Reference group PS
Independent variable Dependent variable: Difference between a voter’s  position 
and the mean position of the deputies of their party
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

































Good economic perceptions 
–0.152***
(.000)
Good perception of immigration
–0.104**
(0.005)
Party identification** – BE
–0.030
(0.287)












Adjusted R2 0.095 0.428 0.097 0.439
N 1350
Valid N 756
Mean of the dependent variable 0.29
Standard deviation of the 
 dependent variable
0.25
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background. The data shows that the divide between a particular voter’s 
position and that of their deputy decreases (significantly) as the voter’s 
political information and interest in politics increase − and this supports H5 
(the greater the political interest, the narrower the divide). The weight of 
party attachment in explaining this divide is very low and not significant, 
while the degree of convergence in the political positioning of the deputies 
from the same party camp is significant but − contrary to our hypothesis − 
positively rather than negatively correlated with the divide between voters 
and deputies. Hence hypotheses H4 (the greater the party attachment, the 
narrower the divide) and H6 (the greater the party unity, the narrower the 
divide) are not confirmed. 
In Model 2, we insert the ‘support for the EU’ variable, in order to check 
if the explanatory variables identified hold even if we control for the voters’ 
EU stance. Such an operation increases the R2 significantly. We observe that 
the more pro-European a voter is, the narrower the divide between their posi-
tioning on Europe and that of their deputy. However, the variables ‘political 
information and interest’ remain significant, and the ‘party attachment’ vari-
able becomes significant at the 0.05 level (although the coefficient is still rela-
tively low). Only education loses its significance.
In Model 3, we introduced the variable likely to explain voters’ support 
for Europe rather than the index itself and we find similar results. The 
model shows that the variable on European support (good perception of 
socio-economic conditions, pro-immigrant sentiments) is significant in 
explaining a narrow divide between a voter and their deputy’s position on 
European integration. 
In Model 4, we repeated the exercise carried out in Model 2, while intro-
ducing a dummy variable for each party the respondent identifies with. The 
model shows that, with other things being equal, the divide between a voter 
and their representative is significantly higher for the CDU than for the PS (in 
line with what has been discussed above), while this makes no difference for 
the other parties. 
In Table 5, we turn to the voters who do not have an opinion on Europe. 
To do so, we divided the answers to the above six questions on Europe into 
two (0 − don’t know/no response, 1 − response) and produced an index 
by taking the mean of the two groups of answers. In Model 1, we tried 
to assess if the variables explaining a narrower divide are also important 
in explaining a voter propensity towards having an opinion on European 
issues. We also included age as a control variable. Again, the data shows 
that political information and interest index and the degree of education are 
positively related with the probability of a voter having an opinion, while 
party attachment and age are negatively correlated. In Model 2, we repeated 
the operation, including the dummies for party identification, and no new 
results were produced. 
Hence, it appears that those who are educated and informed about, and 
who are interested in politics are not only more likely to have an opinion 
about Europe, but are also likely to be closer to the position of their repre-
sentatives. These results are in line with the main findings of other electoral 
studies on Portugal. In a similar fashion, the Comparative National Election 
Project shows that informational intermediaries exert a significant impact on 
voting choices − particularly in elections where partisan predispositions are 
less relevant − and that the discussion of political issues is by far the most 
important source of information (Magalhães 2007).
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CONCLUSION 
In this article, we compared and tried to explain deputies’ and voters’ percep-
tions about various dimensions of European integration. Our empirical exer-
cise confirmed certain existing theories, but also showed that several notions 
of conventional wisdom do not stand up to objective scrutiny.
The general assertion that the political elite’s perceptions tend to be more 
pro-integration finds some support in our analysis, but the results strongly indicate 
Table 5: Ordinary least squares estimates of the determinants of the voters’ knowledge about the EU.
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.005; *** p < 0.001
**Reference group PS
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: Voters 
knowledge of the European Union
Model 1 Model 2




















Party identification** – BE 0.019
(0.555)












Adjusted R2 0.262 0.263
N 1350
Valid N 765
Mean of the dependent 
 variable
0.67
Standard deviation of the 
dependent variable
0.20
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 11. Dichotomised to 
distinguish those who 
never discuss politics 
from those who discuss 
politics rarely or often.
this difference − in the Portuguese case − is smaller than has been suggested in 
the mainstream literature on this topic. The data showed that citizens are more 
in favour of enlargement than their representatives, and demonstrated that in 
one dimension deputies are more polarised than their voters − they are more 
strongly in favour of the EU, while the percentage of deputies and voters who 
are strongly opposed to European integration is almost identical.
On closer examination, these assertions hold true only for the deputies 
of the three parties that have been in government (PS, PSD and CDS-PP): 
the deputies of the BE and CDU-PCP are much less supportive of European 
integration than their supporters. Hence, we do not find support for the belief 
left-wing parties are more congruent than their right-wing counterparts.
Finally, we tried to explain the divide between a voter and the positioning 
of their deputy on European integration, and observed that the main explana-
tory variable for a narrow divide is political interest and information. We do 
not find strong support either for the party attachment or party unity hypoth-
eses. Interestingly, political interest and information − together with educa-
tion − also explain the probability of a voter having an opinion on European 
issues. Hence, uninterested and uninformed voters are more likely to lack an 
opinion on Europe or, if they have one, to disagree with their representatives. 
APPENDIX 
All variables, apart from education and age, are computed in such a way as to 
take a continuous value between 0 and 1. 
Index of support for Europe
The dependent variable is an index based on the following survey questions: 
Do you think that a political Europe is necessary? • 
Do you trust the European Union?• 
Generally speaking, do you think that Portuguese membership of the • 
European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? 
Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it • 
already has gone too far. What is your opinion?
All in all, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at • 
all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?
The index we computed was calculated by measuring the mean of the values 
for the answers to the questions above. 
The measurement of political interest is an index based on the following 
survey questions, computed in a similar way as the index above. 
Do you discuss politics?• 11
Are you interested in politics?• 
The measurement of economic perceptions is an index based on the following 
survey questions, computed in a similar way as the index above. 
How do you assess the Portuguese economy? • 
How do you assess the change in the Portuguese economy? • 
How do you assess your personal economic conditions?• 
How do you assess the changes in your personal economic conditions?  • 
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The measurement of pro-immigrant sentiments is an index based on the 
following survey questions, computed in a similar way as the index above: 
Do you think that immigration enriches Portuguese society?• 
Do you think that immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs • 
of Portugal? (Coding inverted.) 
Do you think that immigrants are good for the Portuguese economy?• 
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